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Of late, there has been considerable discussion of the so-called problem of fragmentation in international law;
1 the term itself implies that diff erential treatment is pathological and resonates with normative legal theory which tends to focus on consistency of rule formulations. We propose to question some of the assumptions of those who have expressed concerns about fragmented treatments in diff erent sectors of international law. Our subject will be statutes of limitation in international agreements and inconsistencies in the application of the judicial invention of the concept of "continuing violations" as a means of circumventing the limitations which time-bars were designed to impose on the jurisdiction of third-party decisionmakers. We are happy to have the opportunity to refl ect on this aspect of fragmentation in a publication dedicated to our dear friend, Rüdiger Wolfrum, whose work in these and other areas has so much enriched international law.
A. Introduction
Governments operate within and must also manage complex legal systems which serve, among their other functions, as critical girders for national political economies. Th e networks of expectations which their legal systems establish and sustain are relied upon by citizens as well as by aliens who choose to enter into or engage those systems. One of the sources of those networks of expectations is now to be found in the increasing number of agreements with other states for the benefi t of third parties, whether they be nationals or aliens, and especially agreements which include commitments to resort to third-party decision. Such agreements, assigning, as they do, decisional power to external w. michael reisman & mahnoush h. arsanjani institutions, have the potential of aff ecting-sometimes signifi cantlyinternal political and economic arrangements. Hence they are carefully craft ed by lawyers on all sides so that all the relevant parties, both the governments who are assuming the obligations and the class of private parties whose members are entitled to benefi t from them, may know precisely to whom they apply, to what they apply and when they apply.
Th e extent of the submission to the jurisdiction of the thirdparty decision makers who are empowered by these agreements is, thus, classically analyzed in terms of the material scope of an agreement (jurisdiction ratione materiae), the personal reach of an agreement (jurisdiction ratione personae) and the temporal extent of an agreement (jurisdiction ratione temporis). International tribunals are bound by law and honor to faithfully implement all the jurisdictional arrangements which parties establish with great care, lest their decisions exceed the jurisdiction assigned to them, for which transgression their decisions may be annulled.
Investment treaties and human rights treaties are, both, examples of treaties in favorem tertii. Th ough part of the same genre, they approach the "when they apply" question quite diff erently. Th e diff erence in approach is especially striking in issues of statutes of limitations and their relation to the category of events that are referred to as "continuing violations. "
B. Intertemporal Dimensions of Investment Law
In the area of international investment law, the "when they apply" question-or jurisdiction ratione temporis-is an artifact which is used to implement many policies besides the comparatively simple question of when the remit of an agreement begins to run and when it ends. Because investment agreements are designed to encourage direct foreign investors to assume risks they might otherwise eschew, the "when they end" issue is a matter of acute sensitivity. Treaties may be denounced by a self-executing political decision but sunk capital-the characteristic feature of much direct foreign investment-cannot simply be picked up and carted home. Hence many investment treaties have what are commonly referred to as "tails. " Th e Energy Charter Treaty, for example, provides in Article 47 on withdrawal:
(1) At any time aft er fi ve years from the date on which this Treaty has entered into force for a Contracting Party, that Contracting Party
